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Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory
Taking Claims
John E. Feet
In 1986, David Lucas purchased two beachfront lots on a
South Carolina barrier island with the expectation of constructing single-family homes. His building plans violated no existing
regulations. In fact, many of the neighboring parcels already had
permanent homes similar to those Lucas wished to construct.
Two years later, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the
Beachfront Management Act, which prohibited the building of
any permanent residential structures on the lots. Lucas's plans
were completely frustrated, and the value of his two lots plummeted to almost nothing.
In Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme
Court held that David Lucas had suffered a "taking" of his property for which the Fifth Amendment would guarantee him just
compensation.' The Court announced that although government
may generally restrict the use of private property without compensation, a "taking" occurs when the regulation "denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land."2
What the Court did not decide, however, is how to determine
the relevant parcel of land that is subject to the regulatory
t B.A. 1992, Brigham Young University; J.D. Candidate 1995, The University of
Chicago.
' 112 S Ct 2886 (1992). The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states: "...nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."
2 Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2893. Regulatory taking cases should not be confused with cases
involving an actual physical invasion of the property. See Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US 419 (1982). See also text accompanying note 40.
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taking inquiry.3 Suppose, for instance, that only one of Lucas's
two parcels were subjected to the government regulation. Would
there have been a taking of only that parcel? Or would the Court
have analyzed the effect of the regulation on the two lots combined, finding that-because some economically beneficial use
remained for the property as a whole-no taking had occurred?
Stated another way, the problem is defining the appropriate
denominator in the regulatory taking "equation." Under Lucas, a
court must compare the loss of property use resulting from a
regulation, x, to the sum of all usage rights inherent in a piece of
property, y. If x/y equals 1, then a taking has occurred; if xly is
something less than one, the property owner is entitled to nothing.4 If the relevant property interest, y, is defined narrowly
enough, as, for example, only those rights that have been regulated away, then a taking will always have occurred, rendering the
Lucas test useless.5 On the other hand, if the relevant property
interest is defined broadly enough, a regulatory taking will never
occur. Determining the relevant parcel is not only an essential
ingredient of the Lucas test, but indeed has proven one of the
most difficult challenges in takings law.'

' The Court stated: "Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make
clear the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured." Lucas, 112
S Ct at 2894 n 7.
" If the regulation fails to prevent all economically viable use of a land parcel, there
is no categorical taking under Lucas. Nevertheless, a court may find a taking to have
occurred under a multifactor balancing test, considering a) the economic impact on the
claimant, b) interference with the owner's reasonable investment-based expectations, and
c) the government's interest in regulating. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v New
York City, 438 US 104, 124 (1977); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v DeBenedictis, 480
US 470, 485-97 (1987). In practice, however, landowners have rarely, if ever, prevailed in
court on the basis of this balancing test alone. For a general discussion of the regulatory
taking equation, see Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv L Rev 1165, 1190-93
(1967).
This all-or-nothing test has been frequently criticized for its discontinuity in the
treatment of various plaintiffs. See, for example, Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2919 (Stevens dissenting); Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal CounciL A Tangled Web of
Expectations,45 Stan L Rev 1369, 1375-77 (1993).
' Consider a city ordinance prohibiting property owners from raising wild hogs on
their property. If the relevant property interest, y, is defined as an easement to raise wild
hogs, then the ordinance would constitute a taking, since it would prohibit all economically beneficial use of that easement.
Professor Epstein argues that all government restrictions on real property outside of
the nuisance context constitute takings. See generally, Richard Epstein, Takings: Private
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Harvard, 1985). The Supreme Court, however, has consistently rejected this approach.
' Lucas was not the first case to raise the relevant-parcel problem, as the Supreme
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To determine the extent of a single parcel, courts have
traditionally looked at factors such as whether land is contiguous, held by a common owner, or used for a single purpose, but
they have usually made such decisions implicitly-without exploring the basis for their methodology. Courts have also applied
these factors inconsistently, making regulatory taking determinations unpredictable and often arbitrary.
This Comment analyzes the problem of defining the relevant
parcel, particularly as it applies to horizontal divisions of land.
Although property interests may be divided other ways-for
example, vertically,' temporally9 , or finctionally'9--the Supreme Court has more clearly resolved the denominator problem
in those contexts." Section I examines the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence concerning the denominator issue. Section II explores the various methods that lower courts have used to define
the relevant parcel within the Supreme Court's parameters.
Section III critiques these methods for defining the relevant parcel, all of which ineffectively resolve the denominator problem.
Section IV proposes a new method of applying the Lucas test,
focusing not on the property owner's actions or the extent of her
ownership, but on the economic potential of the land itself. Under
this standard, a taking has occurred when any horizontally
definable parcel, containing at least one economically viable use
independent of the immediately surrounding land segments, loses
all economic use due to government regulation.

Court had for some time relied on diminution in value as a factor in regulatory takings.
See, for example, Agins v Tiburon, 447 US 255, 262 (1980); Hodel v Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 US 264, 295-96 (1981); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v
Mahon, 260 US 393, 413 (1922) ("One fact for consideration in determining such limits is
the extent of the diminution."). A determination of the diminution in value depends on
how the parcel of land in question is defined.
One commentator has suggested that Lucas will bring little change to the outcome of
regulatory taking cases unless it signals a narrowing of the relevant parcel. See Note, The
Effect of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on the Law of Regulatory Takings, 68
Wash L Rev 415 (1993).
" This is the most common way of dividing property rights. It is meant to include
any division into parcels, lots, or the like, as may be shown on a map.
' The divisions of a parcel into air rights, surface rights, or subsurface rights are
examples of vertical divisions of land.
' This is the division of property interests into present and future estates.
10 This includes the division of property into easements, rights of way, servitudes, etc.
While the Court has prohibited the vertical or functional severance of property
rights, Penn Central,438 US at 130-31; Keystone, 480 US at 500; Andrus v Allard, 444 US
51, 65-66 (1979), it has upheld a narrow view of the denominator when temporal divisions
are at stake. FirstEnglish Evangelical Lutheran Church v Los Angeles County, 482 US
304 (1987).
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Another way of characterizing this "independent economic
viability" standard is that it gives property owners a limited
freedom to define the relevant parcel in a way that constitutes a
taking. The primary limitations on that freedom are: 1) the
identified parcel must contain at least one economic or productive
use independent of the surrounding land interests; and 2) the
property may not be divided into uses, functions, or vertically defined interests. This approach would not only better conform to
the purposes of both the Takings Clause and Lucas's "economically viable use" test, but would avoid many of the arbitrary and
even discriminatory problems posed by alternative doctrines.
I. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON THE TAKINGS
DENOMINATOR

A. The Nonseverability Rule
As a general rule, Supreme Court precedent requires courts
to measure the effect of a given regulation on a whole parcel of
land, and not on individual strands of property rights. A homeowner, therefore, who is prohibited from running a magazine
stand on her front lawn does not have a valid taking claim simply because her right to run a magazine stand was completely
extinguished through regulation. The need for such a rule is
obvious if the Lucas test is to have any meaning. Unfortunately,
commentators and courts have too frequently assumed that this
is the end of the denominator issue,' when in fact two important questions remain unanswered. When does the
nonseverability rule apply, and what constitutes a whole parcel?
Two Supreme Court cases, Penn Central TransportationCo.
v New York City" and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v
DeBenedictis,4 provide important background for answering
these questions. In Penn Central, the Penn Central Railway Company entered into a contract for the construction and lease of an
office building above its Grand Central Station in New York City.
Because the station was designated as a historic landmark, Penn
Central was required to obtain authorization from the city's
1
See, for example, John A. Humbach, "Taking" The Imperial Judiciary Seriously:
Segmenting PropertyInterestsAnd JudicialRevision of Legislative Judgments, 42 Cath U
L Rev 771, 796 (1993) (contending that Justice Scalia's hypothetical in which a rural
developer is deprived of all economically viable use of 90% of a tract, but retains use in
the remaining 10%, is clearly not a taking under the nonseverability rule).
'3 438 US 104 (1978).
14 480 US 470 (1987).
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Landmarks Preservation Commission for the alteration. The
Commission denied two alternate plans for the construction on
the grounds that an office building of such magnitude would
the existing station and destroy its architectural apoverwhelm
5
peal.
Penn Central filed suit in New York state court, claiming
that the city's rejection of its building plans constituted a taking
of private property without just compensation. The trial court
held in favor of Penn Central, but the New York Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, avoiding
consideration of whether any economically viable use remained
for the station by expanding the denominator to include Penn
Central's other real estate holdings in the city. 6
The Supreme Court affirmed the New York Court of
Appeals's decision, though without necessarily accepting the
inclusion of Penn Central's additional real estate holdings into
the analysis. The Court did, however, explicitly reject Penn
Central's proposal to consider the air rights above the station independently from the existing structures. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan explained:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights
in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected
a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of
the action and on the nature and extent of the interference
with rights in the parcel as a whole-here, the city tax block
designated as the "landmark site."'8
Determining that Penn Central had failed to show that the station was deprived of all economic use, the Court held that there
had been no taking. 9
Penn Central, 438 US at 116-18.
Id at 119-20. "[E]ven if the Terminal proper could never operate at a reasonable
profit, some of the income from Penn Central's extensive real estate holdings in the area,
which include hotels and office buildings, must realistically be imputed to the Terminal .... ." d at 121.
" The Court noted the New York court's analysis without comment, id, but determined that no taking had occurred by looking at the effect on only the terminal. Id at 13638. In Lucas, the Court explicitly rejected the analysis of the New York Court of Appeals
as "extreme" and "unsupportable." 112 S Ct at 2894 n 7.
's Penn Central, 438 US at 130-31.
Id at 138. The Court emphasized that Penn Central is not precluded from building
smaller structures and that building rights are transferable to nearby property under
"

's
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A majority of the Supreme Court employed similar reasoning
in Keystone, which considered the effect of Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act on the property rights of mining companies." Under the Act,
Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental Resources ("DER")
issued regulations requiring 50% of the coal beneath certain
protected structures to be kept in place to provide surface support.2' Keystone, which had purchased mining rights as well as
waivers for any damage caused to the surface from mining, argued that this constituted a taking. In particular, Keystone argued that the regulations destroyed the value of the support estate,2 2 which was recognized under Pennsylvania law as a distinct and severable set of property rightsY
The Supreme Court held in a five-to-four decision that the
regulation of Keystone's mining rights did not amount to a taking.' Refusing to consider the support estate or portions of the
mineral estate separately, the Court emphasized that takings
jurisprudence must consider the "parcel as a whole."25 The
Court also relied on a statement from its previous decision in
Andrus v Allard: "[W]here an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of
property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is
not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety."26 The Court regarded Pennsylvania's recognition of a support estate as a "legalistic distinction" having no bearing on the
analysis, and concluded no unlawful taking had occurred."
The Keystone decision is especially striking because its facts
are nearly identical to those in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon,

New York zoning laws. Id at 137.
20 480 US 470.

Id at 476-77.
The support estate constitutes the rights to the coal that holds the surface in place.
When owned in conjunction with the surface estate, it gives the right to be free from
surface damage caused by mining. When held by the owner of the mineral estate, it gives
the right to cause such damage.
23 Id at 500. Keystone also unsuccessfully argued that the regulation unconstitutionally impaired the obligations of its contract. Id at 502.
21
22

2

Id at 501-02.

Id at 497, quoting Penn Central,438 US at 130-31.
Keystone, 480 US at 497, quoting Andrus, 444 US at 65-66. In Andrus, the Court
considered the effect of an ordinance prohibiting the sale of goods containing eagle feathers on merchants engaged in the trade of Indian artifacts. 444 US at 52-55. The Court
held that since the owner could use the artifacts for display purposes and even charge
admission, the objects had not been deprived of all economically viable use, but merely of
their highest or best use. Id at 66.
27 Keystone, 480 US at 500.
2
26
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in which the Court held in favor of the property ownerY Pennsylvania Coal, like Keystone, involved a Pennsylvania law restricting a coal company's ability to remove certain coal from the earth
after it had purchased the mineral rights in question." Writing
for the majority, Justice Holmes conceded that the mere diminution of property value due to government regulation does not
necessarily constitute a taking." He stated, however, that
"[wlhen [the regulation] reaches a certain magnitude, in most if
not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the act," and concluded that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 1 Although
Justice Holmes did not discuss the property interest against
which a court must inquire whether a regulation has gone "too
far," he assessed the effect of the regulation on "certain coal" that
Pennsylvania had rendered valueless, thus suggesting an extremely narrow view of the relevant parcel. 2
Despite the factual similarity between Keystone and Pennsylvania Coal, the Keystone majority distinguished Pennsylvania
Coal on two grounds. First, the legislation in Pennsylvania Coal
was a private benefit statute, whereas the regulations in Keystone were issued for the public benefit."3 Second, the DER regulations did not make the mining of "certain coal" commercially
impracticable as the earlier law had done. 4 Justice Stevens further contended that "certain coal," as discussed in Pennsylvania
Coal, did not mean individual pillars of coal, but rather the mining of a certain kind of coal. 5 Despite Justice Stevens's efforts
to distinguish Pennsylvania Coal, however, many consider the
two decisions to be plainly inconsistent.3 8
260 US 393 (1922).
The Pennsylvania Coal Company sold the surface rights of a large tract of land, reserving the right to mine coal. The buyer expressly assumed the risk of surface damage
caused by mining. But in order to prevent damage to surface estates, the state of Pennsyl2

vania subsequently passed legislation that substantially restricted the types and quantities of coal that could be mined in the state. Id at 412-13.
'o Holmes wrote: "Government could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general

law." Id at 413.
S Id at 413-15.
' "To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it." Id at 414. In a
dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis argued that the effect of the regulation should be
measured against the value of the entire property, including the surface estate not owned
by the coal company. Id at 419.
" Keystone, 480 US at 485-86.
3' Id at 493.
"Id
at 498.
See, for example, Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2894 (referring to the two decisions as incon-
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Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in Keystone, emphasizing
that, from the property owner's perspective, regulations can
cause "as complete [a loss] as if the [government] had entered
upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of
it."3" A taking therefore occurs whenever "the government by
regulation extinguishes the whole bundle of rights in an identifiable segment of property."" According to the dissent, the
twenty-seven million tons of coal that Keystone was no longer
able to mine clearly constituted an "identifiable and separable
property interest" worthy of Fifth Amendment protection. 9
B. Limits of the Nonseverability Rule
Although the Supreme Court has established a general rule
against the conceptual severance of property rights, the denominator issue remains unresolved for two reasons. First, the cases
leave unclear in which contexts the nonseverability rule applies.
Second, the Court has not articulated a method for defining the
"parcel as a whole." Until these issues are resolved, courts must
continue to confront the question: denial of all economically viable use of what?
1. Contexts in which the nonseverability rule is not applied.
The Supreme Court has refrained from invoking the
nonseverability rule in two contexts: physical intrusions on land,
and temporal divisions of land. In both of these contexts it has
applied what amounts to a complete severability rule. In Loretto
sistent on the denominator issue); Mid Gulf,Inc. v Bishop, 792 F Supp 1205, 1214 n 5 (D
Kan 1992) (claiming that Pennsylvania Coal had been overruled); Richard A. Epstein,
Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 S Ct Rev 1, 4-5 (arguing that Keystone has the
effect of "gutting, although not explicitly overruling," Pennsylvania Coal).
3
480 US at 516, quoting United States v Causby, 328 US 256, 261 (1946). This
reasoning from the property owner's perspective seems to have been adopted by a majority of the Court in Lucas. 112 S Ct at 2894 (addressing the issue from "the landowner's
point of view").
Keystone, 480 US at 517 (Rehnquist dissenting).
Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist also criticized the majority for failing to rely on state
law in determining what constitutes a separable property right. Since Pennsylvania
recognized the existence of a distinct support estate, he concluded the majority erred in
failing to consider the Act's effect on the support estate. Id at 518-20.
Under Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis, a State's recognition of an "estate" presumably would provide an outer limit to the relevant parcel, but would not preclude a
narrower analysis where the property interest is separable and identifiable. Otherwise,
Rehnquist's discussion of the twenty-seven million tons of unminable coal (which constituted only a part of the mineral estate) as a separate interest would be inconsistent with
his discussion of state law.
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v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Court held that
when a physical invasion of private property is involved, a taking
occurs no matter how small the affected land segment may be.4"
In Loretto, a New York statute required the owner of a small
apartment building to allow the installation of cable television
wires and connection boxes on her building so her tenants could
have access to cable television.4 Although the invasion consisted of two small cable boxes and the connecting wires, the Court
held it to be a taking.4 2 Loretto therefore abandons the
nonseverability principle in one class of regulatory takings.
The Supreme Court has also upheld the temporal severability of property rights. In First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v County of Los Angeles, the Court held that a regulation
depriving a property owner of all economically viable use for a
limited identifiable time period constituted a temporary taking
under the Fifth Amendment.4 3 The Church filed an inverse condemnation claim in California state court in response to an ordinance prohibiting construction on its property. The California
Court of Appeal, however, affirmed the lower court's refusal to
award monetary damages on the grounds that simply invalidating the statute would remedy the violation." The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that mere invalidation of a statute would
fail to remedy the temporary deprivation of use occurring between the time the ordinance took effect and the time it is invalidated.4 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority, arguing that "'temporary' takings which, as here, deny a landowner
all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent
takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation."' First English establishes the principle that property
rights may be severed into time shares with no apparent restrictions. Insofar as a landowner can show that the property rights
of a given parcel have been completely extinguished for an identifiable period of time, a taking has occurred.4"

40

458 US 419 (1982). See also Lucas, 112 US at 2893 (stating that compensation is

required for physical invasions, "no matter how minute the intrusion").
41 458 US at 423.
4 Id at 435-41.
482 US 304, 321-22 (1987).
4

Id at 307-09.

45 Id at 321.
41 Id at 318. See also San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v San Diego, 450 US 621, 657

(1981) (Brennan dissenting) ("Nothing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that
'takings' must be permanent and irrevocable.").
41 Justice Stevens dissented from the majority opinion in First English for precisely
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Thus, an open question remains: Are horizontal groupings of
property interests subject to the nonseverability rule of Penn
Central and Keystone-both of which deal with the vertical severance of property-or to the complete severability rule of Loretto
and FirstEnglish?
2. Defining the parcel as a whole.
Even where the nonseverability rule unquestionably applies,
ambiguity remains because the Supreme Court has provided little guidance as to what constitutes a "parcel as a whole," especially with respect to horizontal divisions of land. In Penn Central, the Court identified the "parcel as a whole" as "the city tax
block designated as the 'landmark site,"'48 suggesting that the
regulation in question should define the relevant parcel. The
Court, however, did not explain how it had reached that result.
Similarly, in Keystone, after quoting the abstract statements from
Penn Central and Andrus concerning the "parcel as a whole" and
the "complete bundle of property rights," the majority declined to
comment on the application of these categories beyond the facts
of the case.4 9
Justice Scalia explicitly discussed the unresolved status of
the denominator question in Lucas:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all
economically feasible use" rule is greater than its precision,
since the rule does not make clear the "property interest"
against which the loss of value is to be measured. When, for
example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a
rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we
would analyze the situation as one in which the owner has
been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has
suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a
this reason. He argued that the temporary taking rule is inconsistent with the Keystone
and Penn Central admonition to consider the effect of a regulation on the parcel as a
whole. First English, 482 US at 329-32. See also Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal
Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudenceof Takings, 88 Colum L Rev
1667, 1676 (1988) (claiming that the Court's approach in FirstEnglish was an exercise in
"conceptual severance").
48 438 US at 131.
49 Keystone, 480 US at 497-501. Justice Stevens wrote: "Although these verbal formulations do not solve all of the definitional issues that may arise in defining the relevant
mass of property, they do provide sufficient guidance to compel us to reject petitioners'
arguments." Id at 497.
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whole .... The answer to this difficult question may lie in
how the owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped
by the State's law of property-i.e., whether and to what
degree the State's law has accorded legal recognition and
protection to the particular interest in land with respect to
which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) value. In any event, we avoid this difficulty in the
present case, since the "interest in land" that Lucas has
pleaded (a fee simple interest) is an estate with a rich tradition of protection at common law, and since the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas found that the Beachfront Management Act left each of Lucas's beachfront lots without
economic value.5 °
Not only does this dictum practically invite lower courts to experiment with the denominator issue, but it also suggests a relatively narrow definition of the relevant parcel. As several commentators have noticed, this footnote bears a striking resemblance to the Keystone dissent.5 The Court not only notes the
inconsistency between Keystone and Pennsylvania Coal regarding
the denominator issue, but suggests the common law methodology expressly rejected in Keystone.52
The Supreme Court has thus failed to provide clear guidance
to courts on the denominator question-especially in horizontal
cases. Not only has the Court never decided a case involving the
horizontal division of land, but it has failed to define "parcel as a
whole." Until this issue is resolved, lower courts will continue to
face the crucial question: economically viable use of what land?
II. LOWER COURT FORMULATIONS OF THE RELEVANT PARCEL
Lower courts-especially the United States Court of Federal
encountered the problem of horizontally
Claims 5 -have
grouping and separating property interests with some regularity.
Instead of employing a consistent methodology, however, the
courts have used a variety of fact-specific and often inconsistent
methods to define the relevant parcel. The various approaches to
defining the relevant parcel may be grouped into three categories:
112 S Ct at 2894 n 7.
6'See, for example, Note, 68 Wash L Rev at 433 (cited in note 6).
52 See Note, 'Property" in the Fifth Amendment: A Quest for Common Ground in the
0
Maze of Regulatory Takings, 46 Vand L Rev 1283, 1309 (1993).
' In 1992, the United States Claims Court was renamed the United States Court of
Federal Claims.
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1) contiguous land under a common owner; 2) multifactor analysis based on reasonable expectations; and 3) the property interest
defined by the regulation or development proposal.
A. Contiguous Land under a Common Owner
A common method of isolating a bundle of property interests
for regulatory takings analysis is to consider all contiguous
property under a common owner as a single, indivisible parcel.
This method of defining the relevant parcel, however, is more
often an unstated assumption than a carefully chosen methodology. Indeed, a number of courts seem to have implicitly employed this uniformity-of-ownership definition without even evaluating the propriety of other rules.'
Courts employing this standard have divided over whether
contiguous property previously owned by the landowner may be
considered, or whether only property owned at the moment of the
regulation should form part of the relevant parcel. For instance,
in Deltona Corp. v United States, Deltona purchased a ten-thousand-acre parcel on the Florida Gulf coast for the purpose of developing twelve thousand single family tracts. 5 Deltona divided
the parcel into five permit areas. It successfully obtained the
requisite permits, and developed and sold the individual tracts in
one area, but the Army Corps of Engineers denied several requests for the development of two other areas.5 6 The Court of
Federal Claims held that the relevant parcel included the whole
ten-thousand-acre tract originally purchased by Deltona, despite
the fact that it no longer owned all ten thousand acres. 7
B. Multifactor Analysis Based on Reasonable Expectations
Although the contiguous-land-under-a-common-owner test is
relatively easy to apply, courts have often abandoned its strict

' See, for example, Bevan v Brandon Township, 438 Mich 385, 475 NW2d 37, 43
(1991); Jones v Town of McCandless, 134 Pa Commw 435, 578 A2d 1369, 1371-72 (1990);
Jentgen v United States, 657 F2d 1210, 1213 (Ct Cl 1981). Compare Corrigan v City of
Scottsdale, 149 Ariz 553, 720 P2d 528, 538 (1985) (holding that a zoning ordinance that
affects one of several contiguous parcels will only be considered in light of its effect on the
combined parcel).
' 657 F2d 1184 (Ct C1 1981).
56 Id at 1188-89.
"7 Id at 1191-94. For the opposite approach from the same court, see Loveladies
Harbor,Inc. v United States, 15 Cl Ct 381, 392 (1988) ("T]his court must limit its focus
upon the value of that property which plaintiffs held when the taking was said to have
occurred.").
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application when other factors point toward grouping the parcels
differently. Among the factors on which courts have relied are
whether the owner uses the property for a common purpose,
whether the land was purchased at the same time, whether there
are one or several tax deeds on the land, whether the owner
considers his various lots as separate entities, and general considerations of fairness. The Court of Federal Claims's discussion
of the issue in Ciampitti v United States is typical:
Factors such as the degree of contiguity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to which the parcel has been treated as a
single unit, the extent to which the protected lands enhance
the value of remaining lands, and no doubt many others
would enter the calculus. The effect of a taking can obviously be disguised if the property at issue is too broadly
defined. Conversely, a taking can appear to emerge if the
property is viewed too narrowly. The effort should be to
identify the parcel as realistically and fairly as possible,
given the entire factual and regulatory environment.58
Relying on multiple factors instead of simply contiguity and
unity of ownership can lead to either a broader or a narrower
definition of the relevant parcel. For instance, in American Savings & Loan Ass'n v Marin County, the Ninth Circuit held that
two adjacent parcels under a common owner should be considered separately if it could be shown that the owner treated the
two parcels separately.5 9 In Ciampitti, however, the Court of
Federal Claims held that when a developer purchases two noncontiguous lots as part of a single transaction, and treats those
lots as one for financing purposes, they may form a single parcel
for takings purposes.6 0
C. The Property Interest
Development Proposal

Defined

by

the Regulation

or

A final category of lower-court opinions focuses on the nature
of the state's regulatory action to define the relevant parcel. In
Twain Harte Associates, Ltd. v Tuolumne County, a county ordinance rezoned a 1.7-acre portion of an 8.5-acre parcel as "open
space," severely limiting the uses to which that portion could be
22 C1 Ct 310, 318-19 (1991).
'

653 F2d 364, 372 (9th Cir 1981).
22 C1 Ct at 320. For a description of the New York Court of Appeals's similarly expansive approach in Penn Central, see text accompanying note 16.
6
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put.6 Rather than consider the regulatory effect on the entire
8.5 acre parcel, for which there remained some economic potential, the court focused on the 1.7-acre segment. The court stated
that "the nature of a particular land use regulation" may have
the effect of "creating separate parcels for 'taking' purposes." 2
To obtain a summary judgment against the owner, therefore, the
county was required to demonstrate that:
(i) the 1.7-acre plot was not economically viable apart from
the larger parcel; (ii) some development would be allowed on
the 1.7-acre plot; or (iii) it would grant compensating densities or other allowances on the larger, 6.8-acre shopping
center parcel, in order to ameliorate the owners' loss of development options with respect to the smaller, 1.7-acre parcel.
The Twain Harte approach therefore focuses less on the owner's
relationship to the property and more on the regulation itself to
identify the relevant parcel. This is evident both through the
claim that a regulation can create a separate parcel, and the
inquiry as to whether the 1.7-acre parcel was economically viable
apart from the larger unit."
The Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims have
employed a similar approach in cases where the alleged regulatory taking arises from the government's rejection of an owner's
proposal to develop a portion of his property or extract its resources. These courts have ruled that when the reviewing governmental body considers and rejects the proposed use of only a
portion of the owner's property, and when it appears highly likely
that similar proposals for the other segments of property would
also be rejected, the court should focus only on the portion defined in the rejected proposal.
Thus, in Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v United States, the
court held that the government's refusal to allow limestone mining on a proposed 98-acre tract constituted a taking of those 98
acres even though the tract was only part of the owner's original

0'

217 Cal App 3d 71, 265 Cal Rptr 737, 739-40 (1990).
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Id at 744-45.

Id at 745.
Nevertheless, the court implicitly uses common ownership and contiguity as a
starting point in the analysis, and then uses other considerations to narrow the analysis.
Other cases adopt a similar approach for zoning laws. See Keith v Town Council, 1992
Conn Super LEXIS 1778; Fifth Avenue Corp. v Washington County, 282 Or 591, 581 P2d
50 (1978).
'
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1,560-acre purchase.' The court reasoned that, given the unlikelihood a similar proposal would be approved for another segment, it would be unjust to consider the possible uses of the full
1,560 acres in the analysis.6
The Federal Circuit did not hold, however, that the entire
1,560 acres had been stripped of all economically viable use.
Instead, it excluded from the analysis those acres for which the
plaintiff had not submitted a proposal, reasoning that the government might now approve future mining proposals in light of the
court's decision that the 98 acres had been taken. 7 The distinction is significant, for although the plaintiff's damages were limited to compensation for the 98 acres, the FloridaRock decision
gives property owners a greater degree of control in defining the
relevant parcel. A property owner anticipating litigation might
submit a proposal involving a certain segment of property for
which there is no other economically viable use. If the proposal is
denied, and it appears that similar proposals would be denied for
the owner's contiguous land interests, the landowner would receive compensation for the segment defined by his proposal even
if the contiguous property has other potential but unrelated uses.
The Court of Federal Claims used a similar approach in
Loveladies Harbor,Inc. v United States, holding that the denial
of a proposal to develop 12.5 acres pursuant to federal wetlands
regulation could constitute a taking, even though the owner's
original 250-acre purchase included economically viable land outside of the area designated as wetlands.' Using the Florida
Rock principle, the court first excluded from the analysis the
owner's wetland holdings not mentioned in the proposal. The
court then excluded the nonwetland holdings from the analysis,
for they were no longer adjacent to the 12.5 acres in question and
therefore could not be considered part of the same parcel.6 9 Although Loveladies Harbor may appear rather formalistic, it
seems to represent a trend in the Court of Federal Claims toward
giving property owners greater control in defining the relevant parcel.70
6 791 F2d 893, 904 (Fed Cir 1986), vacated on other grounds, 18 F3d 1560 (Fed Cir
1994).
" "We do not think that the mere possibility a permit might be granted, like the
possibility one might put a pot of water on a hot stove and have it freeze, is a reality
requiring us to deem that viewing the 1,560 acres as a whole, Florida Rock might in
theory mine a lot of limestone, or perhaps market a housing development as appellant
also would have us speculate." Id.
7

Id at 904-05.
15 Cl Ct at 391-93, 399.

69

Id at 392-93.

7' But see Ciampitti, 22 Cl Ct at 320 (holding that two noncontiguous segments of
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ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING THE

RELEVANT PARCEL
Any regulatory taking test that focuses on the diminution in
value or viable use of property would be useless if it did not limit
the litigant's ability to sever those rights into increasingly smaller units. Without such a limitation, a property owner could always define the relevant interest as precisely those rights that
were abrogated-a complete negative easement in every case.71
The need for such a limitation is fully evident; what scholars
often overlook, however, is that any test must also prevent the
state from defining the parcel as broadly as it wishes.
Although both scholars and courts have made sweeping
statements against the "conceptual severance" of property rights,
they necessarily assume some set of "severing" criteria to separate one parcel from another.7 2 Otherwise, the entire world
would constitute the only "parcel as a whole." These severing criteria, though usually implicitly assumed by courts and commentators, should come to the fore if a fair and rational formulation
of the relevant parcel is to be achieved. Three of the most common sets of criteria used are: unity of ownership, actions or expectations of the owner, and government-controlled criteria.7
A. Unity of Ownership
The most common criterion for horizontally isolating one
parcel of property rights from all others focuses on where one
owner's property rights end and the next owner's property rights
begin. Indeed, even the narrower methodologies employed in
Twain Harte, FloridaRock, and Loveladies Harboremploy unity
of ownership and contiguity as starting points in the analysis.74
land must be viewed as a whole since they were purchased and financed together).
71 This aspect of the diminution-in-value test has been discussed for years. See, for
example, Michelman, 80 Harv L Rev at 1190-93 (cited in note 4); Joseph L. Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 Yale L J 36, 60 (1964).
72 Consider the Court's statement in Andrus that "where an owner possesses a full
'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." 444 US at 65-66. This statement necessarily depends on some separating criteria for distinguishing one bundle from another.
" Although these analytical categories generally correspond to the three current
methodologies previously discussed (contiguous land under a common owner, the
multifactor analysis, and the property interest defined by the regulation or development
proposal), the parallel is not exact. Most notably, unity of interest, while particularly
central to the contiguous-land-under-a-common-owner methodology, is invoked under the
other approaches as well. The discussion of that criterion, therefore, is relevant to all
three lower-court methodologies.
7 See, for example, Loveladies Harbor, 15 CI Ct at 391.93 (beginning the analysis
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The most obvious virtues of a unity-of-ownership criterion- are
that it is easy to employ and that its application often reflects an
intuitive sense of what constitutes a "parcel" of land. 5 Despite
these strengths, unity of ownership is a problematic criterion for
defining a parcel of property for several reasons.
First, as a conceptual matter, the unity-of-ownership criterion fails to give property the full value of the sum of all its parts.
Consider Ciampitti, in which a developer purchased an area of
wetlands and a parcel of noncontiguous upland territory in a
single transaction."6 The court's decision to analyze the owner's
combined interest as one parcel effectively rendered both the
wetlands and the uplands less valuable than if they had been
purchased by different individuals. Such a system not only violates the standard assumption of property as a fungible and consistent set of entitlements, 7" but it could also lead to perverse
incentives on the part of landowners. For example, knowing what
he now knows about the law, Robert Ciampitti probably would
have purchased the uplands or the wetlands, but not both. Instead, he might have devised a contractual arrangement whereby
another person would hold title to part of the land, but Ciampitti
would develop it, bearing both the risks and profits of the enterprise. Alternatively, if the transaction costs of such an arrangement were preclusive, he may have simply developed less land,
leaving the remainder to a less efficient developer or no developer
at all. Under either scenario, an inefficient allocation of resources
results, so as to increase the likelihood of compensation for future
regulations.
Justice Brandeis emphasized this weakness in his dissenting
opinion in Pennsylvania Coal:
The rights of an owner as against the public are not increased by dividing the interests in his property into surface
and subsoil. The sum of the rights in the parts can not be
with the 250 acres originally purchased by the owner, then narrowing the focus within
those 250 acres).
"' Although land could be conceptually separated into parcels for any conceivable pur-

pose, it seems that in the modem world it is often done to distinguish ownership. Consequently, what the average person thinks of as a "parcel" of land often has the distinguishing characteristics of a deed, a common owner, and a surveyed boundary beyond which
ownership changes. There is nothing inherent in the word "parcel," however, which
prevents a single person from owning two separate parcels side by side, or from several
individuals owning various parts of a single parcel.
76

22 Cl Ct at 311-13.

7' For a thorough discussion of this aspect of the denominator problem, see Epstein,

Takings at 57-62 (cited in note 5).
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greater than the rights in the whole .... I suppose no one
would contend that by selling his interest above one hundred
feet from the surface he could prevent the State from limiting, by the police power, the height of structures in a city.
And why
should a sale of underground rights bar the State's
7
power?
Although the issue in Pennsylvania Coal involved a vertical division of land, the problem identified by Justice Brandeis is no different in the horizontal context. If an owner cannot limit the
power of the state by selling his air or underground rights, why
should he be able to do so by selling horizontally adjacent property rights? The common-ownership standard creates just such a
system. 9
Another problem with the common-ownership standard is
that it arbitrarily discriminates against those who happen to
have a larger group of property rights in a single place. Some
claim that this turns the diminution-in-value test into a deeppocket rule, forcing extensive holders of property to suffer a
greater loss in property rights to maintain a valid taking
claim. 0 But this understates the problem. The outcomes under
this standard are often arbitrary, denying compensation to those
with less wealth as well as to those with more. For example,
suppose that five individuals each own equally sized beachfront
lots. In addition, they each own private homes. But whereas the
first four owners live across town, the fifth has her home on a lot
directly behind her beach lot. If a regulation were enacted restricting all viable use of the beachfront property, the first four
would be compensated while the fifth might not.8 If a deeppocket rule is intended, would not an inquiry into the owner's
assets, liabilities, and income stream be more appropriate?

"' 260 US at 419 (Brandeis dissenting). At least one lower court has followed Justice
Brandeis's reasoning in PennsylvaniaCoal. See Mid Gulf,Inc. v Bishop, 792 F Supp 1205,
1214 (D Kan 1992) (holding that the complete abrogation of an oil and gas lease does not
effect a taking where surface rights remain viable, even though those surface rights are
owned by a different party).
' See also Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why The Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle, 57 S Cal L Rev 561, 568 (1984) ("This approach may cause owners to make
elaborate and socially useless splits of their property rights, so that any one property
right affected by a regulation is completely taken, and the courts will have to reunite the
bundle of property rights to determine whether there truly has been a taking.").
'"

See id.

s' For similar examples demonstrating the arbitrariness of ownership as a criterion,
see Michelman, 80 Harv L Rev at 1234 (cited in note 4).
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Failure by most courts to even recognize these problems, let
alone justify them, makes one suspicious of unity of ownership as
a factor in defining the relevant parcel. One unspoken intuition
that may have led courts to rely on unity of ownership is the
notion that those with more property are harmed less when some
of it is devoted to public use. However, the Takings Clause does
not set a minimum level of harm that one must have suffered to
receive just compensation. It simply states a principle that the
government pays for what it takes.
Alternatively, the unity-of-ownership rule might be justified
on the grounds that it redistributes wealth. Corporations and
wealthy individuals are more likely to lose taking claims under a
unity-of-ownership standard, because they are more likely to own
large, indivisible tracts of land. The benefits of government regulation, on the other hand, would benefit everyone equally, thus
effecting a net transfer of benefits from those who have more to
those who have less.
Given the numerous alternative means of redistributing
wealth, however, interpretation of the Takings Clause is an inappropriate means of accomplishing this goal. First, takings jurisprudence cannot ensure an even and equitable transfer of wealth.
Although a unity-of-ownership standard would effect a net transfer of benefits from the wealthy to the poor, individual cases
would vary widely. Many wealthy individuals and corporations
have only small and scattered real estate holdings, whereas relatively poor individuals, like some farmers and ranchers, may own
large, contiguous quantities of land. The effects of regulation are
also extremely unpredictable and inequitable, affecting some
individuals severely and others not at all. Finally, courts should
leave the task of implementing and carrying out redistributive
goals to politically accountable legislators and executive officials
whose constituencies are relatively broad based. Although some
politically accountable body, such as a zoning board, must promulgate a redistributive regulation before it can ever be challenged in court, it is precisely this form of hidden redistribution
that should be suspect under the Takings Clause. Many regulations, especially the discretionary decisions of zoning boards,
harm only a few politically powerless individuals while the benefits may flow to many. The local political process, therefore, rather than checking potential redistributive abuses, may only add
fiel to the fire. 2
In fact, government policies of this sort seem to be precisely what the Takings
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B. Subjective Belief of the Owner
Other criteria used by the courts to define the relevant parcel measure the actions or expectations of the owner to distinguish one parcel from another. These may include an owner's
actual use of property, her intended use, or a number of other actions or expectations that indicate that she actually considers a
certain portion of property to be a separate and distinct parcel.
Although the use of these criteria will sometimes avoid problems
created by the unity-of-ownership standard,' such use would
lead to similar arbitrary and unfair results."
For example, an owner who purchases two one-acre lots with
the intention of building a home on one lot and an office building
on the other would likely be compensated if all development were
prohibited on the office lot. However, if the same owner instead
purchases the lots intending to build a two-acre office complex
over both, he would not be entitled to compensation, even if his
second choice would have been to build a home and an office
building as in the first case. Ironically, the owner loses more in
the second scenario-for he loses both his best and second-best
uses of the office lot-but is entitled to nothing by way of compensation.
Perhaps in an effort to avoid such results, courts have sometimes jumbled these subjective factors along with others into an
ad hoc test, deciding each case without committing to any explicit
rule of decision. Although ad hoc decision making has tradition'ally played an important role in regulatory taking claims, the Supreme Court intentionally avoided this approach in Lucas by
announcing a "rule" of "categorical treatment" where an owner
has lost all economically beneficial use of his property.85 This
categorical rule, however, would break down if the denominator
inquiry were to depend completely on a set of ad hoc criteria. An
ad hoc approach would easily mask the prejudices of individual

Clause is designed to correct, either by preventing the government action in the first place
or by ensuring "justcompensation." See Rose, 57 S Cal L Rev at 581-82 (cited in note 79)
(arguing that Holmes's decision in Pennsylvania Coal is designed to curb redistribution).
'3 For example, in the hypothetical variation on Ciampitti discussed in the text following note 77, the owner of the wetlands would not be able to avoid inclusion of the
uplands in the analysis simply by formally vesting title in another person.
'" The unity-of-ownership criterion may in fact be considered part of the larger
category of the owner's subjective belief, insofar as it depends on the owner's choice to buy
or sell property prior to the regulation.
' 112 S Ct at 2893-94. But see Justice Stevens's dissent, id at 2918-19 (objecting to
the majority's adoption of a "categorical rule" in regulatory taking cases).
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judges. Moreover, whatever factors or ideologies motivate a
court's decision, a system based on the rule of law would require
that such criterion be open and explicit. Both government and
property owners could then act with a clear understanding of
their rights and obligations under the Constitution.
C. Government-Controlled Criteria
A third category of criteria for horizontally distinguishing
property rights looks to the government's actions rather than
those of the owner. Some courts, for example, have implied that
the ordinance or regulation affecting the property in question
should be determinative in defining the relevant parcel. Such an
approach, however, should be highly suspect since it is the government that is constrained by the Takings Clause. In Twain
Harte,86 for example, the government might have worded its regulation carefully so as to avoid Fifth Amendment liability. Rather
than simply zoning the 1.7 acres as open space, creating a separate parcel, it could have enacted a comprehensive zoning scheme
for the entire 8.5-acre "parcel," disallowing development on the
1.7-acre "portion," but explicitly allowing for some "economic use
of the remainder. Courts could attempt to guard against such
abuses, but only through reliance on some external standard to
judge the government's regulatory definitions of property. If another standard is necessary to determine what constitutes a just
division, it is better to use that standard in the first instance.
Another approach based on government-controlled criteria
was suggested by the majority in Lucas:
The answer to this difficult question may lie in how the
owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the
State's law of property-i.e., whether and to what degree the
State's law has accorded legal recognition and protection to
the particular interest in land with respect to which the
takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of)
value."
The Lucas majority, however, does not elaborate on this proposal
or on how a state's common law could be used to distinguish a
bundle of rights horizontally. One possibility is that any interest
recognized as an "estate" at common law could constitute a sin-

265 Cal Rptr 737. See text accompanying notes 61-64.
87 112 S Ct at 2894 n 7.
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gle, indivisible parcel for takings purposes. This interpretation,
however, fails to resolve difficult cases, such as when a developer
buys a large tract of land and subsequently divides it into multiple lots for resale. The question whether the developer owns one
estate or many is no clearer than the question whether there is
one parcel or many.
Rather than relying on formalistic labels such as "estates" to
resolve the issue, one might interpret Justice Scalia's dictum as
suggesting analysis of the property owner's rights under common
law. Specifically, one would inquire whether the common law
allows a particular set of property rights to be severed and traded as an independent unit. This appears to be Chief Justice
Rehnquist's suggestion in his Keystone dissent." The application
of this principle is easier to grasp in the vertical Keystone context-where Pennsylvania allowed a support estate to be severed
from the surface and mining estates-than in the horizontal
context. Under most common law regimes, one may legally sever
any horizontally identifiable segment of an estate and sell it,
thereby creating two estates from one. If the common law "right
to sever" were determinative of the regulatory taking denominator, then a property owner alleging a taking could horizontally
define the relevant parcel as narrowly as she chose. Although
conceptually sound, this rule could lead to extremely costly results in a modern regulatory state. Virtually all set-back ordinances, which restrict how close to the street a property owner
may build, would be unconstitutional without compensation. 9
As Justice Holmes wrote in Pennsylvania Coal: "Government
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in
the general law." 0 Although this rule as applied to horizontal
divisions of land would not go quite so far as to require compensation for any diminution in value, its costs would nevertheless
be extraordinary. It seems unlikely that even Justice Scalia
would go so far. Rather, one wonders whether he simply borrowed the suggestion of employing a common law analysis from

' "In these circumstances, where the estate defined by state law is both severable
and of value in its own right, it is appropriate to consider the effect of regulation on that
particular property interest." 480 US at 520.
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of set-back ordinances against taking
claims in Gorieb v Fox, 274 US 603, 610 (1927).
' 260 US at 413. See also Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 Yale L J 1077, 1159 (1993)
("e price of simplicity would be extremely high.").
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the Keystone dissent without fully considering how it would apply
to horizontal divisions of land.
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE DENOMINATOR

Through reliance on the subjective criteria of ownership and
actual or intended use, courts have gone astray. The regulatory
taking inquiry should instead focus on whether the property
interest proposed to have been taken is in fact substantial
enough to warrant Fifth Amendment protection as an independent bundle of rights. Although different methods of measuring
the substantiality of a property interest could be devised, it
seems that the most logical method would depend on its economically productive potential as an independent unit. This Comment
therefore proposes the following rule for horizontal divisions of
land: any identifiable segment of land is a parcel for purposes of
regulatory taking analysis if prior to regulation it could have
been put to at least one economically viable use, independent of
the surrounding land segments.
Under this test, the task of a court would not be to determine which division of land is the correct parcel, as if there were
only one correct answer. Instead, a court would begin with the
plaintiff's assertion that a particular parcel of land had been
taken, examining the parcel to see if it could have been put to at
least one economically viable use independent of the surrounding
land prior to the regulation. If so, the court would determine
whether the parcel had been deprived of all economically viable
use through government regulation. The plaintiff would seek to
define a parcel broadly enough to show that prior to regulation
the parcel contained an economically viable use independent of
the surrounding property interests, but he would also seek to
define the parcel narrowly enough to prove that no economically
viable use remains.
This standard of independent economic viability grants owners the central role in defining the parcel to be analyzed by the
court. Although some commentators have resisted granting the
owner such control,9 1 they assume that such a role would be unlimited-that an owner could identify the relevant property inter-

91 See Radin, 88 Colum L Rev at 1674-78 (cited in note 47); Frank Michelman,
Takings, 1987, 88 Colum L Rev 1600, 1614-21 (1988); Essay, Takings: The Fifth
Amendment, Government Regulation, and the Problem of the Relevant Parcel, 8 J Land
Use & Envir L 381, 402 (1993).
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est as exactly those rights that had been extinguished by regulation.2
Under a rule of substantiality, however, the ability of the
owner to define the parcel would be limited in two important
ways. First, the rule would apply only to horizontal divisions of
land. Under clear Supreme Court precedent, a property owner
would have no authority to divide property rights into uses, easements, servitudes, or the like." In addition, under the authority
of Penn Central and Keystone, courts must consider all air, surface, and subsurface rights of a particular parcel as a single bundle of property rights. 4 That a different rule would apply for
horizontal divisions of land, however, is not surprising-for there,
the nonseverability rule cannot apply in the same absolute way
that it does in the vertical and functional contexts. Once the
horizontal limits of a "parcel" are determined, one can logically
say that it extends from the center of the earth to the heavens,
and to every conceivable use thereof. 5 But one cannot push the
nonseverability rule to its absolute limit in the horizontal dimension, or all property would blur into one. As has been previously
discussed, courts need some further set of criteria to define a parcel horizontally.
Another important limitation on the owner's ability to define
a parcel as a whole is the requirement of substantiality. For any
given section of land to constitute a legitimate "parcel," it must
be shown that there existed prior to regulation at least one economically viable use for the land, the value of which is derived
independently of the immediately surrounding land interests.

' Radin's treatment of the issue is typical:
[W]e must observe that as soon as one adopts conceptual severance ... there is an
easy slippery slope to the radical Epstein position. Every curtailment of any of the
liberal indicia of property, every regulation of any portion of an owner's "bundle of
sticks," is a taking of the whole of that particular portion considered separately.
Radin, 88 Colum L Rev at 1677-78 (cited in note 47).
' See, for example, Andrus, 444 US at 65-66 (holding that a restriction on the sale of
certain items is not a taking because "the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a
taking"). See also Lucas, 112 S Ct at 2895 n 8 ("It is true that in at least some cases the
landowner with 95% loss will get nothing, while the landowner with total loss will recover
in full.").
' Penn Central, 438 US at 130 (air rights); Keystone, 480 US at 497 (subsurface
rights).
" This Comment assumes that vertical and functional severability are not allowed
even when there is a difference in ownership. The issue, however, has not been resolved
in the courts, and rarely arises.
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This limitation has two parts. The first, requiring that the
parcel contain at least one economically viable use prior to the
regulation, follows directly from the Lucas test. If the land had
no economically viable use prior to the regulation, then a regulation cannot be said to have deprived the owner of all such use.
The second part of this limitation, requiring the proposed use to
derive its economic value independently of the immediately surrounding land interests, is a less obvious but nevertheless important element in limiting the range of legitimate parcels. In many
situations, an identifiable segment of land may be put to no economically viable use, other than to expand or beautify a building
or business operation existing on a neighboring segment of land.
The most obvious example of this is the property between the
edge of a building and the street. In most situations, this buffer
zone would be of no economic use to anyone except the owner of
the building, and the owner of the building typically would have
no economic use for it other than to plant grass, expand the existing enterprise, or otherwise add value to a larger segment of
land. In such a case, it would be inappropriate to consider the
buffer zone an independent parcel for regulatory taking purposes,
for it has no economic use in and of itself."
If this limitation did not apply, then owners disadvantaged
by a set-back ordinance could almost always maintain successful
inverse condemnation claims. That would not only violate longstanding Supreme Court precedent upholding the presumed validity of set-back ordinances, 7 but would also cause an enormous upset in well-settled expectations.
Under the proposed standard, a set-back ordinance would not
require compensation unless one of two conditions were met. If
the ordinance is so restrictive as to make use of the entire lot
unfeasible, the owner could claim a taking of the entire lot. Similarly, if the owner could prove an existing and independently
viable use for the buffer zone, such as operating a magazine
stand next to the street, then she should be compensated for the
opportunity cost of that magazine stand if its operation is completely prevented." Under no circumstances, however, should an

' At least one lower court has considered the absence of independent economic
viability in a parcel of land to preclude analysis of that parcel. See Twain Harte, 265 Cal
Rptr at 745 (stating that summary judgment against the landowner is justified if it is
shown that "the 1.7-acre plot was not economically viable apart from the larger parcel").
See, for example, Gorieb v Fox, 274 US 603 (1927).
This example highlights the problem that would emerge if severance damages were
allowed in regulatory taking cases as they are in physical taking cases. If severance
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owner of a city lot be compensated for what is in fact a diminution in value of the entire lot by alleging that the buffer zone had
been completely taken.9
Undoubtedly, some definitional issues regarding the "independent economic viability" of a parcel will remain, just as they
remain under the Lucas Court's phrase "all economically viable
use." A simple question for a court to consider in arriving at an
assessment of independent economic viability would be whether
the property in question could profitably be put to use if it were
the owner's only parcel. If the answer is yes, then the parcel
should be considered independently. If the answer is no, however,
the landowner should be required to propose a broader parcel for
the denominator. The resolution of most cases under this test
should be clear and predictable.
One possible criticism of this test is that it is highly manipulable by property owners because it depends on potential economic uses of property, rather than actual uses or expectations. An
owner might simply assert that a piece of property has a particular economically viable use, such as for setting up concession
stands, when in fact she had no intention of putting the land to
such use. These sorts of claims, however, would be rare given
that the property owner would bear the burden of proof as to
each element.
First, the owner must prove that a particular parcel of land
has the potential for economically viable use as an independent
unit. A particular use must be more than merely feasible. Rather,
it must produce positive economic benefits given all of the costs
involved. Although this test ultimately depends on how the property could be used, a plaintiff will most easily prove the economic
viability of a proposed use by demonstrating that that is how the
property would be used. When a proposed use for a segment of
property conflicts with its actual or presently intended use, the
property owner would be forced to explain why he would forego

damages were awarded, a plaintiff could allege a seemingly minimal taking of a buffer
zone and thereby receive compensation for the loss of value to his entire property interest.
Because the standard of independent economic viability disregards a property owner's
adjacent property interests in the initial regulatory taking inquiry, it should disregard it
in awarding damages as well. In other words, by narrowing the focus to a particular
segment of land, the plaintiff should be limited to receiving compensation only for loss of
economic uses to which the land would have been put if it were his only segment of
property.
" This would be analogous to the plaintiff's argument in Penn Central that a restriction on the ability to expand Grand Central Station was a taking of the air rights above
the terminal. 438 US at 130.
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such economic gain. One possible explanation is that the parcel
has even greater value as part of a larger group of property
rights, but nevertheless could produce positive economic value as
a single unit." ° Another possibility is that the opportunity has
only recently emerged or been discovered. In any case, a landowner would have to convince a court by a preponderance of the
evidence that the explanation is real and not simply crafted for
the litigation.
The landowner would also have to prove a deprivation of all
economically viable use due to the regulation under Lucas. This
should in fact be a difficult burden, especially since the existence
of a post-regulatory use for the property need not be independent
of surrounding land interests (as with a potential use needed to
prove substantiality). Thus, a building owner could not claim
damages from a set-back ordinance for loss of magazine stand
profits if in fact the operation of a magazine stand would lower
the value of the entire lot. In such a case, the buffer zone obviously has substantial economic use to the building owner as open
space, and would continue to have that use after the regula01
tion.'
Although the test of independent economic viability would
cause a significant reconceptualization of the denominator issue,
it would not create a radical change in actual outcomes. Consider
the case of Grand Forks-Traill Water Users, Inc. v Hjelle, in
which a North Dakota statute prohibited development of gas,
water, oil, power, or communication lines within 100 feet of a
state highway." 2 A water company, which had purchased easements from various property owners to run a water line through
lands near the highway, built the water line, and sued for com-

10

In many cases, this will be easy to prove. Often it is obvious that a piece of proper-

ty is valuable and has real economic potential. It is only determining which use is most
profitable that is difficult. It is property such as this, however, that clearly warrants Fifth
Amendment protection.
10" This is not to say that the mere existence of some scenic value of a piece of property to its owner will always defeat a taking claim. However, when the scenic value that a
buffer zone adds to a building is significant enough that the building owner would clearly
pay a substantial sum to have the buffer zone remain clear if needed, then a set-back
ordinance cannot be said to have deprived an owner of all economic use of the buffer zone
when he owns the building as well.
A similar difficulty arises under the Lucas test in determining whether the resale
value of a piece of property is significant enough to constitute a viable economic use. For a
recent discussion of this issue by the Federal Circuit, see FloridaRock Industries v United
States, 18 F3d 1560 (Fed Cir 1994) (vacating its previous decision because, even under a
narrow view of the denominator, a reasonable resale value for the property remained).
10 413 NW2d 344, 345-46 (ND 1987).
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pensation when the state ordered the water line moved. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that no taking had occurred,
invoking the nonseverability rule of Penn Central and Keystone.1° 3 Although the court gives no indication as to what it
considered to be the "parcel as a whole," it would likely have
reached the same result under the standard of independent economic viability. The water company could not plausibly claim
that the long strip of land from which it was forced to move its
water line was "taken," for there would appear to be no use for
the land independent of the water network. What good is a single
stretch of a water line by itself? The company could widen the
strip so as to claim that farming is possible on the land, but in so
doing it would defeat its claim that all economically viable use
was extinguished from the property. Finally, the company could
not plausibly claim that its entire network of water lines had
been taken, because those water lines farther away from the
highway would maintain economic viability. Unless the statute
was so restrictive as to put the entire water operation out of
business, the company would have no valid taking claim.
The only cases in which the standard of independent economic viability would produce a different result are those in which a
different result should occur. These cases include those such as
Deltona Corp. v United States' 4 and Ciampitti v United
States..5 in which a developer purchases a large tract of land
and the government prohibits development on only part of the
original purchase. Where the total restrictions on development
affect a significant enough segment of land that it could be independently developed for a profit, the principles of fairness and
justice underlying the Fifth Amendment require that the owner
be compensated for his loss. Such a case would in principle be no
different than that of Lucas.
CONCLUSION

In his well-known dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v
San Diego, Justice Brennan emphasized one of the most important reasons for applying the Takings Clause to restrictions on
the use of private property:

'0' Id at 346-47.
104 657 F2d 1184. See text accompanying notes 55-57.
105 22 C1 Ct 310. See text accompanying notes 76-77.
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From the property owner's point of view, it may matter little
whether his land is condemned or flooded, or whether it is
restricted by regulation to use in its natural state, if the
effect in both cases is to deprive him of all beneficial use of
it. From the government's point of view, the benefits flowing
to the public from preservation of open space through regulation may be equally great as from creating a wildlife refuge through formal condemnation or increasing electricity
production
through a dam project that floods private proper06
ty.1
Justice Brennan's justification for temporary regulatory takings
not only led to the subsequent overturning of San Diego Gas &
Electric in First English, °7 but was also instrumental to the
Court's decision in Lucas.0 ° Similarly, the fact that an owner
holds adjacent property which may still be developed, or considered his property as part of a larger parcel, should not bar his
compensation for the lost property any more than if the state had
taken the title to his lands. The standard of independent economic viability restores this basic intuition to the law. It also significantly improves the clarity and predictability of regulatory takings law. Finally, it provides a rational basis for assessing whether a citizen has been called upon to sacrifice too much in the
interests of society, and for correcting those costs through just
compensation.

"

450 US 621, 652 (1981).

107 482 US 304 (1987). See text accompanying notes 43-47.
10 Citing Brennan's dissent, the Court noted that "total deprivation of beneficial use

is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation." Lucas,
112 S Ct at 2894.

